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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
VERNON J. SMITH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILMER LEE BARNETT, 
Defendant and Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case 
No. 
10,320 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was brought by the plaintiff to re-
cover for personal injury damages allegedly caused 
by the defendant when struck by the defendant's 
car while crossing Rainbow Drive in Murray, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before a jury, which brought 
in a verdict of "no cause of action." The plaintiff 
moved for a new trial, which motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an affirmance of the verdict 
of "no cause of action" and the denial of the new 
tl'ial. 
1 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The accident which gave rise to this suit occur-
red on December 29, 1962 at 6 :15 P. M. at the 
intersection of Rainbow Drive and State Street in 
Murray, Utah. Rainbow Drive runs east from State 
Street, and State Street runs north and south. The 
Montek Building, which includes the plaintiff's busi-
ness, Towne and Country Rambler, in the southern 
half of the building, is located on the southeast 
corner. There are two entrances to Towne and 
Country Rambler, one in the rear of the building and 
one in the front. The northern half of the building 
is occupied by the Montek Corporation. The sidewalk 
in front of the Montek Building on the east side 
of State Street is 12 feet 5 inches wide. On the 
northeast corner of the intersection is the Cumber-
land Motor Co., a service station which has an aband-
oned gas pump island and used cars sitting along 
the State Street side. A sidewalk runs north and 
south along the east side of State Street. There is 
a stop sign and a utility pole on the northeast corner. 
It was dark (R. 119) and the road was dry. 
The defendant was driving south on State Street, 
which is composed of three lanes for traffic in each 
direction, on the inside lane. His lights were on 
( R. 275). As he approached Rainbow Drive he en-
tered the left turn lane ( R. 27 5) , looked east at 
Rainbow Drive and saw no one (R. 279), then looked 
at approaching traffic, hesitated for one car to pass 
( R. 27 5), looked east again ( R. 280) and made a 
left turn into Rainbow Drive. \Vhen he was about 
15 feet east of the west edge or front of the Montek 
Building ( R. 276) the defendant saw a dark object 
rise up in front of him and sit on the hood (R. 276). 
The defendant was driving with his foot on the 
brake pedal ( R. 282) and he stopped within two to 
three feet ( R. 282). His speed was between 5 and 
10 miles per hour (R. 281-282). The defendant 
found the plaintiff lying 5 feet directly east of the 
defendant's car (R. 113). The front of defendant's 
ca1· was 26 feet 3 inches east of the easterly edge 
of State Street and 15 feet 7 inches east of the 
assumed center of an unmarked crosswalk across 
Rainbow Drive. There was a dent left of center on 
the driver's side of defendant's car ( R. 281). The 
center of the plaintiff was 10 feet 11 inches north 
of the curb on the south side of Rainbow Drive and 
24 feet 8 inches south of the north curb. The distance 
from the center of the left turn lane on State Street 
to the easterly edge of the unmarked crosswalk is 
86 feet 6 inches. The distance from the utility pole 
on the northeast corner to the dent on the car was 
26 feet. 
There were no lights on in the Montek Building 
(R. 274) and the nearest street lights are one on the 
east side of State Street 100 feet south of Rainbow 
Drive one on the east side of State Street 100 feet 
' 
north of Rainbow Drive, and one 150 feet west 
of the intersection of State Street and Rainbow 
Drive ( R. 115). The nearest light on Rainbow Drive 
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was one block east, at the intersection of that street 
and Brown Street ( R. 123). 
The plaintiff is part owner and manager of 
Towne and Country Rambler. He testified that he 
was walking back from a visit to Zion Motors, which 
is located on the west side of State Street about one-
fourth of a block north of Rainbow Drive. He was 
dressed in a dark suit. He had crossed over State 
Street and walked south on the sidewalk on the 
east side of State Street, to the northeast corner of 
the intersection of Rainbow Drive and State Street. 
He asserts he looked up Rainbow Drive, looked south 
on State Street, then looked to the right at the left 
turn lane on State Street where he saw no cars, and 
then proceeded across Rainbow Drive (R. 195-196). 
When he was two-thirds of the way across he became 
aware of car lights. He shouted, and then was hit 
( R. 196). The plaintiff did not look back at the left 
turn lane on State Street after he stepped off the 
north curb (R. 118). He was looking at the traffic 
on State Street coming north (R. 118). He did not 
see the defendant until just before he was hit. 
The plaintiff claims to have suffered a large 
hematoma over the lumbar area of his back, an egg-
like bump on the back of his head, abrasions over his 
buttocks and ruptured discs in his neck that required 
fusion. 
Upon the basis of this evidence, with the excep· 
tion of some evidence going to a claimed loss of 
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income, which we shall mention later, the case was 
submitted to the jury. The jury brought in a verdict 
of "no cause of action." The plaintiff moved for a 
new trial on the basis of a juror's misconduct, and in 
support of said motion submitted affidavits of three 
jurors and Kay Lewis who interviewed the jurors. 
The motion was denied. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Denying The 
Motion For New Trial Based On Jury Mis-
conduct; There Being Neither Competent 
Evidence Of Such Misconduct Nor A Show-
ing of Prejudice To The Plaintiff's Case 
The rule has been clearly announced in Utah 
that jurors will not be allowed to impeach their own 
verdict by affidavits, except where there has been 
a chance verdict or where it is a result of bribery, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 59(a) (2). Rule 59 
allows jury misconduct as a ground for a new trial, 
but does not allow such misconduct to be proved by 
jurors' affidavits except in the two situations men-
tioned above. The cases in Utah have applied the 
rule strictly. 
In the early case of People v. Flynn, 75 Utah 
378, 384, 26 Pac. 1114 (1891) the court declared: 
"It is well settled that affidavits of jurors 
will not· be ·received to impeach or question 
their verdict, nor to show the grou~ up~ 
which it was rendered, nor to show their mis-
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understanding of fact or law, nor that they 
misunderstoo~ the charge of the court, or the 
effec~ of then· verdict, nor their opinions, 
surmises, and processes of reasoning in arriv-
ing at a verdict." (Emphasis ours) 
And in Honier v. lntennountain Abstract Co., 
9 Utah 193, 33 Pac. 700 and Hepworth v. Covey 
Bros. Aniusenient Co., 97 Utah 205, 91 Pac. (2d) 
507 ( 1939) the affidavits of jurors as to their mis-
conduct were not allowed in as evidence for a new 
trial. The courts have not been hesitant to disallow 
the affidavits even though the misconduct alleged 
is of a serious nature. In Morrison v. Perry, 104 
Utah 151, 140 Pac. ( 2d) 772 ( 1943) one juror called 
to the attention of the other jurors that there was 
insurance in the case. Four jurors submitted affi-
davits as to the discussion on insurance. The court 
held that the affidavits were not competent because 
of the statutory prohibition of their use except in 
a chance verdict and bribery. And in Wheat v. Den-
ver & R.G.W.R. Co., 122 Utah 418, 428, 250 Pac. 
(2d) 932 (1952) one juror mentioned that a settle-
ment off er had been made in the case, and discussed 
another suit against the defendant. The court re-
fused to allow affidavits or oral testimony of the 
jurors. The court said: 
" ... To permit litigants to get j~rors to 
sign affidavits or testi~y to ma~ters dis~ussed 
in connection with their functions as Jurors 
would open the door t~ inq~i::Y into aJl matter 
of things which a losmg htigant might con-
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sider improper; misconceptions of evidence or 
law, offers of settlement, personal experiences. 
. . . Such post mortems would be productive 
of no end of mischief and render service as a 
juror unbearable." (Emphasis ours) 
The court then held: 
" ... Both the affidavits and oral testi-
mony offered being incompetent, there exists 
no basis for considering whether the jury was 
in fact guilty of misconduct which would have 
required the granting of a new trial." (Supra, 
page 429) 
Cases in other jurisdictions have also followed 
this rule strictly. In Maffeo v. Holmes, 47 Cal. App. 
(2d) 292, 117 Pac. (2d) 948 (1941) the factual 
situation was similar to the case at bar. The de-
fendant hit a pedestrian while driving at a slow 
rate of speed with his lights on. The question of 
lighting was a critical issue. Some of the jurors 
visited the scene at the time of night that the acci-
dent occurred, in order to observe the lighting, and 
they concluded that the plaintiff would have been 
hidden by a shadow. This visit was discussed in 
the jury room. Affidavits of jurors were taken 
after the verdict went against the plaintiff. The 
court strongly condemned the actions of the jury, 
but said the affidavits were incompetent unless they 
showed a chance verdict. The court gave this rea-
soning. 
" ... and for the very good reason that 
no juror can specifically establish that he 
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reached his verdict by reason of secret evi-
<;Ience of the locus in quo related by an erring 
JUror and not by reason of the testimony of 
the sworn witnesses, the arguments of counsel 
the i?structio!1 of t~e court, or the legitimat~ 
suasions of his co-Jurors. The jury must be 
presun!ed to have. done its dl;lty in re~ching 
a verdict. . . . This presumption prevails ex-
cept where proof authorized by the legislature 
justifies the upsetting of the verdict." (Supra, 
pages 951) 
And in George 'V. City of Los Angeles, 51 Cal. 
App. (2d) 311, 124 Pac. (2d) 872 and Wilson v. 
Oklalwnw Ry. Co., 207 Okl. 204, 248 Pac. (2d) 1014 
(1952) the courts refused to consider in motions for 
new trials affidavits of the improper visits of jurors 
to the scene of the accident. In the Wilson case the 
court refused the juror's affidavits and oral testi-
mony on the grounds that the verdict cannot be im-
peached by such means for misconduct within or 
without the jury room. 
The rule is thus clear - the affidavits of the 
three jurors in this case are not competent evidence 
to impeach their verdict, and thus serve as no basis 
for establishing the alleged misconduct upon which 
a new trial was predicated. 
The affidavit of Kay Lewis is likewise incom-
petent evidence as it is merely hearsay of what the 
jurors told him. In Glazier v. Crani, 71 Utah 465, 
267 Pac. 188 ( 1928) the court said the affidavits 
of third parties as to what jurors told them were 
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under the same rule as the affidavits of the jurors. 
And in Herndon v. City of Seattle, 11 Wash. (2d) 
88, 118 Pac. (2d) 421 (1941) the affidavit of one 
juror that she heard another juror say he had visited 
the scene of the accident was declared to be mere 
hearsay and as such was insufficient to invoke the 
discretion of the trial court to grant a new trial. 
To the same effect is Tartacower v. New York City 
Transit Authority, 169 N.Y.S. (2d) 695 (1957) 
where it held that affidavits of other jurors and third 
persons as to a juror's statement of an alleged view 
of the scene were not competent proof to establish 
misconduct. And in Kearns v. Hall, 91 S.E. (2d) 
648, 197 Va. 736 (1956) the court adopts the same 
position and cites numerous cases in support. 
The affidavits of the jurors and Lewis are by 
statute and public policy incompetent evidence of any 
misconduct. There being no other evidence of the 
alleged misconduct, the denial of a new trial on that 
ground was clearly within the discretion of the trial 
court. 
However, even if there were competent evidence 
of an improper view, the plaintiff has still failed 
to show that he was so prejudiced thereby that the 
trial court abused its discretion in refusing the mo-
tion for a new trial. 
The mere assertion that a juror has miscon-
ducted himself is of little value. There must also 
be proof that the misconduct was such that in light 
of the facts of the case the verdict would have been 
affected. Herndon v. City of Seattle, supra. The 
rule to be applied here appears to be the same as 
that applied in motions for mistrial. In Burton v. 
Zion's Cooperative Merchantile Institution, 122 Utah 
360, 249 Pac. (2d) 514 (1952) the court said a 
mistrial should not be given if the court believes the 
misconduct "probably did not prejudice" the moving 
party. And once the mistrial is refused the appellate 
court must let that decision stand "unless his deter-
mination appears to be so unreasonable that upon 
review it appears that he was plainly wrong in that 
there is a strong likelihood that the plaintiff could 
not have had a fair trial," supra at page 365. And 
the latitude granted the trial court is indicated in 
Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines Inc., 104 Utah 
9, 22, 137 Pac. (2d) 374 (1943). The court there 
said 
"In denying the motion for a new trial 
on the ground of misconduct on the part of the 
jury, the trial c~urt did not abuse i!s discre-
tion, even assummg that on the showmg made 
a contrary ruling could be sustained." 
Thus, in showing prejudice to himself, the plaintiff 
must show more than a mere possibility, Ison et al 
v. Stewart, 105 Colo. 55, 94 Pac. (2d) 701 (1939). 
He must show that the verdict was affected or rea-
sonably would have been affected by the misconduct, 
Saunders v. A. M. Williams Co., 62 Pac. (2d) 260, 
155 Ore. 1 ( 1936). In this case neither one of those 
criteria has been satisfied. 
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There is considerable doubt as to whether the 
alleged misconduct could have added anything new 
to the jury's understanding of the case. Merely tak-
ing a casual view of the scene, where there was no 
dispute as to measurements, location of objects or 
physical description, works no prejudice to the mov-
ing party.In Redd v. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., 
supra, the jurors made measurements while taking 
an authorized view of the scene. The court said the 
fact that the jurors made certain measurements was 
not prejudicial because there was no material dis-
pute as to the measurements and thus their use 
of the measurements in coming to a verdict was of 
no consequence. 
In the present case the alleged misconduct 
of the juror Fuller in making a left hand turn onto 
Rainbow Drive and accelerating up to 12-13 miles 
per hour was not in any way prejudicial to the plain-
tiff. The plaintiff in the trial did not allege that the 
defendant was exceeding 10 miles per hour. The 
dispute was as to the time and space required to 
stop, assuming a maximum speed of 10 miles per 
hour. There is no allegation that the juror made any 
skid tests, nor that he even stopped after he made the 
left turn. The fact that the juror made a left turn 
and found he couldn't go much over 10 to 15 miles 
per hour up to the unmarked crosswalk was merely 
cumulative upon a minor issue and did not go to the 
material issues in the case - the point of impact 
and the light conditions that night. If anything, the 
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test of the juror showed that the defendant could 
have been going faster than he testified, and thus 
any prejudice working from the misconduct would 
be in the plaintiff's favor. 
A case similar to the present situation is that 
of Harden v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 112 N.W. 
(2d) 324, 326, 253 Iowa 341 ( 1961). The case in-
volved a car-train collision. The court found con-
tributory negligence on the basis of skid marks and 
testimony as to the speed that curves approaching 
the crossing could be taken. Two jurors visited the 
scene and negotiated the curves, testing at what 
speeds they could be taken. In sustaining the trial 
court's denial of a new trial on this ground, the 
court said: 
" ... The jurors found they could drive 
it three to five miles an hour faster. This 
matter was discussed by various jurors. While 
we cannot approve of such practice and trial 
courts should clearly inform jurors as to such 
conduct, we are not prepared to say this 
ground should have been sustained. It deals 
with mere opinions as to what may be a safe 
speed, and under the situation cannot so clear-
ly be said to have reasonably influenced the 
verdict, as to lead us to say the trial court 
abused its discretion." 
And in Herndon v. City of Seattle, supra, a juror 
visited the scene of an intersection collision. The 
trial court granted a new trial. This was reversed 
on appeal. The court said that the short stop made 
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by the juror at the intersection brought nothing new 
into the case, for there was no dispute as to physical 
surroundings, visibility and measurements. The 
court said that the bringing in of new evidence by a 
juror must be shown with certainty in order to be 
a basis for a new trial. 
And in Jacob v. Miner, 67 Ariz. 109, 191 Pac. 
(2d) 734 (1948) the court said that it was the con-
duct of the parties at the time of the accident which 
was in issue, not the physical conditions. Thus pre-
judice to the defendant was not affirmatively prob-
able and the denial of a new trial must be affirmed. 
The alleged visit by juror Fuller added nothing 
new to any material issue of the trial, and if anything 
was added it was an implication of speed which could 
only work to the plaintiff's advantage. There was 
no basis for the trial court to find that prejudice 
probably occurred, and the evidence is clearly in-
sufficient to show that the trial court abused its 
discretion. 
But even if it be assumed that the verdict of 
the juror Fuller was affected by the visit he allegedly 
made, there still would be no prejudice to the plain-
tiff since the verdict was unanimous and only three-
fourths of the jurors need agree in order to constitute 
a valid verdict in a civil case. Utah Constitution, 
Article l, Section 10; Tartacower v. New York City 
Transit Authority, supra. 
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The plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial on 
the basis of jury misconduct for another reason -
failure to file an affidavit in support of such motion, 
stating that he had no knowledge of the misconduct 
before the jury retired. In Glazier v. Crani, supra, 
the court held that the appellants could not validly 
claim the right to a new trial where they had failed 
to file such an affidavit. The court said: 
" ... It is a general rule, subject to few 
exceptions, that a motion for a new trial upon 
this ground (juror misconduct) must be ac-
companied by affidavits showing that the mis-
conduct complained of was not known to the 
party moving for a new trial - or his counsel 
- until after the case was submitted to the 
jury." 
The defendant submits, therefore, that the 
plaintiff is not entitled to a new trial by reason of 
any misconduct of the jury because no competent 
evidence was submitted in support of such motion. 
Even had there been competent evidence of miscon-
conduct, the plaintiff has failed to show any preju-
dice to his case and has failed to file the necessary 
affidavit that he had no knowledge of such alleged 
misconduct before the jury retired. 
POINT II. 
The Trial Court Did Not Err In Giving An 
Instruction On Unavoidable Accident. 
The rule in Utah is clear: An instruction on 
unavoidable accident may be given where there is 
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evidence that the accident occurred without the negli-
gence of the parties involved. In Nelson v. Lott, 81 
Utah 265, 17 Pac. (2d) 272 (1932) the defendant 
struck the plaintiff with his car when the plaintiff 
stepped out from the side of the road. The court 
gave an instruction on unavoidable accident and the 
defendant objected on the ground that the instruc-
tion contained words which indicated that an un-
avoidable accident could be caused by the defendant's 
negligence. The court held that the instruction was 
proper even though there were questions of negli-
gence and contributory negligence. 
In Denison v. Chapman, 6 Utah (2d) 379, 314 
Pac. (2d) 838 ( 1957) the court sustained the in-
struction of unavoidable accident. There the car 
of one defendant slid into the truck of the other 
defendant, causing the truck to cross the center line, 
colliding with the plaintiff. The court held that the 
icy road was the proximate cause of the accident and 
not the actions of the defendants. The court found 
that the sliding of the car into the truck was not 
due to the negligence of the driver but was due to the 
conditions. 
And of great significance in this appeal is the 
case of Porter v. Price, 11 Utah (2d) 80, 355 Pac. 
(2d) 66 (1960). There the court was faced with an 
instruction identical to that given in the present 
case, which is the instruction set out in Jury Instruc-
tion Forms, Utah, Section 16.1. There the defend-
ant's car went out of control when he suffered a 
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diabetic insulin shock. The verdict was in the de-
fendant's favor and the plaintiff appealed on the 
basis that it was error to give the instruction on 
unavoidable accident. The court held the instruction 
to have been properly given, and drew an important 
distinction in rejecting the case of Butigan v. Yellow 
Cab Co., 49 Cal. (2d) 652, 320 Pac. (2d) 500 (1958). 
The appellant there, as here, cited the Butigan case , 
for the proposition that it is error to give the instruc-
tion. The court distinguished the Butigan case on 
these grounds: 
". . . In that case there was substantial 
evidence of negligence by the defendants, and 
there was almost no affirmative evidence that 
the accident resulted from any cause other 
than those circumstances which were under 
the control of an ordinary prudent man, yet 
the jury decided for the defendant. The court • 
stressed this inconsistency in deciding that the 
instruction was prejudicial error, and such 
inconsistency is not present in the instant case 
Here, much of the evidence tended to show 
circumstances beyond the control of a reason-
able man and the jury decided accordingly. 
Also, in the Butigan case, the instructions 
themselves were misleading in suggesting to 
the jury that they 'should consider unavoid· 
ability as an issue or ground of defense sep· 
arate and apart from the questions of negli· 
gence and proximate causation.' Such con· 
fusion is not apparent in the instruction here." 
(Pages 82-83) 
1G 
The court then went on to lay down a test for when 
the instruction was proper: 
" ..• However, there are some situations 
;vhere the evidence is ~usceptible of being so 
mterpreted that an accident occurred without 
negligence on the part of anyone, and if it 
is reasonably susceptible of such interpreta-
tion, and a party requests it, the trial court 
commits no error in so advising the jury." 
(Emphasis ours, Page 84) 
The rule in Utah then is that the instruction 
will be allowed in circumstances where the evidence 
is reasonably susceptible of being interpreted as 
showing a lack of negligence on the parties involved. 
The Butigan doctrine has thus been rejected in Utah, 
as it has been in various other states. Ridgway Na-
tional Bank v. North American Van Lines Inc., 326 
Fed. (2d) 934 (CCA 3rd 1964); Panaro v. Cullen, 
185 A. (2d) 889 (1962); Franco v. Fujimoto, 47 
Hawaii 408, 390 Pac. (2d) 740 (1964); Hackworth 
v. Davis, 87 Idaho 98, 390 Pac. (2d) 422 (1964). 
It should, however, be noted that even some of the 
California cases indicate doubt as to how far the 
Butigan case really went. Rayner v. Ramirez, 159 
Cal. App. (2d) 372, 324 Pac. (2d) 83 (1958); and 
Emerton v. Acres, 160 Cal. App. (2d) 742, 325 Pac. 
(2d) 685 (1958). 
The great majority of states allow the unavoid-
able accident instruction to be given. In 65 A.L.R. 
(2d) 24 it is stated that in most states the instruction 
may be given in motor vehicle cases where the evi-
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dence discloses facts supporting such instruction. 
The note then cites 37 jurisdictions in support of that 
statement . The note also mentions on page 23 that 
the position taken by a few courts that do not allow 
the instruction "will no doubt continue to be pro-
ductive of numerous appeals concerning matters 
not worth the attention, expense and risk they have 
entailed." 
The Utah rule, clearly allowing the instruction, 
leaves one final question: Whether there was such 
conclusive evidence of negligence in the present case 
that the trial court abused its discretion in giving 
the instruction. A review of the facts and cases sim-
ilar to this situation shows that the court acted well 
within the limits of its discretion. There is no evi-
dence that the defendant acted negligently in any of 
the sequence of events. He made a proper left turn 
after the immediate traffic going north had cleared. 
He had his lights on. He testified that he had looked 
at the crosswalk area before he turned, and that he 
saw nothing. His speed was well within the speed 
limit - testified to by the defendant and his wife as 
being less than 10 miles per hour. The defendant 
was driving with his foot on the brake. The plain-
tiff points out that the defendant was negligent in 
either not looking or not seeing what was there to 
be seen, but this is merely a conclusion that the plain-
tiff could have been seen. The defendant must see 
only that which a person acting reasonably under 
the given conditions would have seen. The facts 
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here show that there was no lighting in the area 
into which the defendant entered, that plaintiff was 
dressed in a dark suit, and that due to the nature of 
the turn defendant's lights may not have been focused 
on the area of impact until just before it occurred. 
The evidence seems easily susceptible of the interpre-
tation that the defendant was not negligent. 
There is also evidence that the plaintiff was 
acting without negligence in that he said he was 
walking in the crosswalk area and watching the 
north-bound traffic due to his knowledge that the 
traffic coming from the south often turned right 
onto Rainbow Drive. 
It thus is clear that the evidence was reasonably 
susceptible of the interpretation that circumstances 
beyond the control of the parties were responsible 
for the accident, and not the acts of the parties. 
The combined factors of darkness and the positions 
of the parties created a situation which could reason-
ably be interpreted as the proximate cause of the 
accident. This point is illustrated in cases with sim-
ilar situations. 
In Nelson v. Lott, supra, the accident took place 
on a road leading into a rodeo ground from a high-
way. The plaintiff had parked his car on the 
shoulder of the highway and walked down to the 
ticket booth situated alongside the rodeo access road. 
He saw the defendant's stopped car about a rod 
away, facing the highway. He purchased his ticket 
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and stepped into the road with his back to the de-
fendant's car as he folded his money. He was then 
struck by defendant's car. Witnesses said that the 
plaintiff had stepped in front of defendant's car 
so quickly that defendant had no time to stop. There 
were definite issues of negligence as to the actions 
of both parties, but the court also found that there 
was sufficient evidence of no negligence that the 
instruction was properly given. 
In a recent New Mexico case the situation is 
almost identical with the present case, Falkner v. 
Martin, 74 N.M. 159, 391 Pac. (2d) 660 (1964). 
There the plaintiff was struck at an intersection 
one hour after sunset. There was a conflict of evi-
dence as to whether she was in the crosswalk. The 
defendant was going 15 to 18 miles per hour with 
his lights on. There was no evidence that the plain-
tiff could have been seen by anyone in the car before 
she was actually hit. The testimony was that she 
"loomed in front of the car." The jury found no 
cause of action. The plaintiff appealed, asserting 
that it was error to give an instruction on unavoid-
able accident. The court affirmed the giving of the 
instruction. The court said that the prior case of 
Lucero v. Torres, 67 N.M. 10, 350 Pac. (2d) 1028 
( 1960) had established the rule that there may be 
due to the nature of the particular motor vehicle acci-
dent genuine questions of unavoidable accident. The 
court then quoted from the Lucero case suggestions 
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as to when such questions were raised: 
. "A prominent feature may be one of sur-
pr1~e~ sudden appearance and reasonably un-
antic1 pated presence of a pedestrian combined 
with circumstances which present;, fair issue 
as to whether the failure of the driver of a 
motor vehicle to anticipate or sooner to guard 
against the danger or to avoid it, is consistent 
with a conclusion of the exercise of his due 
care. In such cases the trial courts are in-
clined to grant the instruction on unavoidable 
accident and their action in so doing is gener-
ally approved by the appellate courts." (Cita-
tions omitted, supra at 662) 
The court then held that there were issues of negli-
gence as to both parties, but that nevertheless there 
was evidence of no negligence, thus warranting the 
instruction on unavoidable accident. 
The reasoning of the New Mexico case is con-
sonant with the Utah view of the unavoidable acci-
dent instruction. Thus, under the facts of the present 
case, which also indicate that the plaintiff "suddenly 
loomed" in front of the defendant's car out of the 
darkness, the only possible conclusion is that the 
facts are reasonably susceptible to an interpretation 
of no negligence. The giving of the instruction should 
thus be affirmed. 
POINT III. 
The Court Properly Instructed The Jury To 
Disregard The Alleged Losses Suffered By 
Plaintiff's Business. 
The law is very clear in disallowing proof of 
business losses in a personal injury action where 
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the ~usiness loss is incapable of being proved directly 
attributable to the injury. The general rule is stated 
in 12 A.L.R. (2d) 296: 
"It is a general rule that evidence of the 
profits of a business in which the plaintiff in 
a personal injury action is interested, which 
depend for the most part upon the employment 
of capital, the labor of others, or similar var-
iable factors, is inadmissable in such an action 
and cannot be considered for the purpose of 
establishing the pecuniary value of lost time 
or loss or diminution of earning capacity, for 
the reasons that a loss of such profits is not 
the necessary consequence of the plaintiff's 
injury and that such profits are uncertain and 
speculative." 
This rule has been accepted in Utah. In Rosen-
thal v. Harker, 56 Utah 113, 189 Pac. 666 ( 1920) 
the court found that the business losses suffered by 
a junk dealer were properly considered in assessing 
damages against the defendant. The court in so 
holding clearly distinguished the situation from one 
where the business was supported by invested capital 
and labor of other persons. The court said on page 
118: 
" ... There was no attempt made to prove 
profits realized from capital invested. In 
fact, the testimony tends to show that :he 
plaintiff had no appreciable amount of cap~tal 
invested in the business conducted by him. 
Therefore the profits proven, and of which 
defendant complains, partook almost wholly 
22 
of the nature of earnings realized by reason of 
the personal efforts and labor of the plaintiff. 
The authorities cited by counesl for defendant 
hold and adhere to the well established doc-
trine and the general rule that profits of a 
business should not be regarded as an element 
of damages in this class of cases. . . . We re-
mark that ordinarily the rule announced by 
the cases cited and relied on is the proper one 
to be followed. However under the facts and 
circumstances of the present case, for the rea-
sons heretofore stated, we think the admission 
of the testimony and the instruction of the 
court complained of by defendant was proper 
and right. There was no appreciable capital 
or investment in the business, and the profits 
or earnings therefrom depend entirely on the 
labor and personal efforts of plaintiff." 
The present facts clearly indicate a situation 
where the general rule does apply. Plaintiff Smith 
was at the time of the accident one-third owner and 
general manager of the Towne and Country Rambler 
Corporation (R. 191). He claims that the $11,000 
obligation which he undertook subsequent to the acci-
dent was a proper element of damages. But that 
claim obviously cannot be sustained. First of all, 
the Towne and Country Rambler Corporation was a 
heavily capitalized corporation with an annual gross 
of nearly a million dollars (R. 229). It employed 
forty employees ( R. 231). It sold new and used cars, 
and thus was in a market of considerable flux. These 
facts alone are sufficient under the general rule to 
exclude the use of its profits and losses and other 
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business related expenditures in assessing damages 
for plaintiff's personal injuries. See Shewry v. Hew·, 
255 Iowa 147, 121 N.W. (2d) 529 (1963). It is 
true that the plaintiff occupied an important posi-
tion in the operation of the corporation, but the fact 
that substantial capital and labor outside of his own 
was being employed negates the direct link necessary 
between the business fortunes and the plaintiff's 
services. Under the rule of the Rosenthal case the 
evidence was properly rejected. 
However, there is also another reason for not 
allowing the evidence as to the $11,000 obligation --
there is no proof that the plaintiff in fact did suffer 
any loss or impairment of his cash position. The 
evidence was somewhat confusing, but it appeared 
that the plaintiff acquired the other two-thirds stock 
in the corporation and gave in consideration the note 
for $11,000. He thus suffered no loss on that trans· 
action. He then transferred the stock to a man 
named Bostrom in exchange for Bostrom's promise 
to make available to the Corporation $55,000.00, 
$20,000 of which he soon paid to the Corporation 
( R. 249). The testimony indicates that the Corpora· 
tion was in financial trouble even before the accident 
(R. 262), that there had been large net losses from• 
September, 1962 through December of that year (R. 
231) and that the cash position on the 1st of Decem· 
ber was poor, with only $766 in the bank (R. 242). 
The $20,000 paid in by Bostrom helped the cash 
position of the Corporation, and by February sub· 
24 
stantial profits were being shown by the Corpora-
tion (R. 233) and total liabilities were reduced (R. 
234). Plaintiff said they were back on their feet 
by March (R. 244). The total sales in 1963 were 
above 1962 (R. 237) and plaintiff testified that he 
made more money in 1963 than he did in 1962 (R. 
237). The evidence submitted was highly speculative 
as to whether there ever was a loss on the $11,000 
obligation. It could have resulted in a profit to 
plaintiff due to its life saving effect upon the Cor-
poration. And the evidence was not clear as to 
whether the obligation was in fact upon the Corpora-
tion and not the plaintiff. 
Under the facts presented the plaintiff could 
not even prove a loss had occurred as well as show 
that the loss was directly attributable to his injury. 
The facts negate both propositions. Thus, the ruling 
of the trial court that the claim of loss was too 
speculative or remote was proper under the facts 
and the law. 
The plaintiff also makes the novel argument 
that the striking of evidence by Instruction No. 10 
is prejudicial error because it lends undue emphasis 
to the defendant. However, the general rule is that 
an instruction should be used in order to prevent 
prejudice upon the party moving for the evidence to 
be stricken. The rule is stated in 53 Am. Jur., Trial, 
Section 671, page 518: 
"In like manner, where evidence is ad-
mitted upon the theory that its relevancy may 
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be subsequently shown by other evidence and 
such evidence is not introduced the ~ourt 
should exclude the irrelevant evidence on its 
own motion and instruct the jury to disregard 
it." 
The facts in this case show that if any prejudice 
was worked, it \Vas upon the defendant by the allow-
ance of extensive testimony as to the alleged business 
loss of the plaintiff. The evidence was allowed in 
with the condition that if it was not tied up later 
the court would entertain a motion to strike (R 
203). Thus, when it was not tied up, the court was 
obligated to strike it by an instruction to the jury. 
It appears that if every time the court strikes 
evidence by an instruction it is construed to mean 
that is disbelieves that party's case not only would 
the court's powers be stifled but great prejudices 
would be worked upon the moving party. The court 
gave the benefit of the doubt to the plaintiff in allow· 
ing the evidence. The plaintiff, therefore, has no 
right to the benefit of the doubt when the evidence 
is stricken. Giving an instruction is the only equit· 
able means to strike evidence allowed in with the 
condition that it be tied up later. The defendant 
had a right to have the jury clearly instructed that 
the evidence was not to be considered. And the plain· 
tiff's fear that the jury may think the judge does 
not believe the evidence is a hazard endured by both 
parties whenever the court rules, and clearly is not 
error. 
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POINT IV. 
The Instructions To The Jury When Read 
As A Whole Were Not Prejudicial To The 
Plaintiff. 
The plaintiff in Point 4 of his Brief points out 
that the instructions over-emphasized the defend-
ant's case, but he supports that assertion with what 
seems to be an objection to the chronological order 
of the instructions and not their content. It has 
been clearly pointed out in a recent case that the 
instructions must be considered as a whole, and the 
fact that a supplemental instruction is given on 
contributory negligence does not mean that undue 
emphasis is to be implied to the plaintiff's detriment. 
Hill v. Cloward, 14 Utah (2d) 55, 377 Pac. (2d) 
186 (1962). The fact that the instructions dealing 
with the duties of defendant were given last is not 
in and of itself material. If the instructions ade-
quately expressed the law of the case and were not 
given in such a way as to mislead the jury they 
are adequate and further inquiry is not warranted. 
53 Am. Jur., Trial, Section 561, page 445. 
The instructions were arranged in what seems 
to be the most logical fashion, with statements of 
the general duties and definitions preceding the in-
structions on specific duties under the evidence. The 
plaintiff doesn't point out any error of law in the 
instructions nor any repetition of a particular point. 
The crux of the objection comes down to the fact that 
the duties of the plaintiff were defined before those 
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of the defendant. This clearly is no basis for pre-
judicial error. 
POINT V. 
The Court Properly Refused To Give Plain-
tiff's Requested Instruction Number 6 -
That Defendant Was Negligent As A Matter 
Of Law In Failing To Keep A Proper Look-
out. 
The plaintiff seems to have greatly over-simpli-
fied the proposition when he states in his Brief at 
page 25, under Point 5, "that if a person fails to 
keep a proper lookout, he is negligent as a matter of 
law." That proposition assumes the critical issue 
- whether or not the defendant under these par-
ticular circumstances acted unreasonably in keeping 
a lookout. The only practical approach, therefore, 
is that taken in Covington v. Carpenter, 4 Utah (2d) 
378, 381, 294 Pac. (2d) 788 (1956) where the court 
said that in most cases the question should be sub· 
mitted to the jury to determine whether the defend· 
ant kept a proper lookout. The court laid down this 
rule: 
" ... Modern traffic complexities make it 
impossible to lay down by judicial rule what 
will always be, or fail to be, reasonable care 
in the operation of motor vehicles. The duty 
to keep a proper lookout is manifest but the 
obedience to or violation of that duty must be 
determined according to particular circum· 
stances .and in full accord with the constantly 
varying exigencies occasioning each acciden~. 
As to what constitutes a proper lookout is 
usually, therefore, a la~ter-day classi~ ques· 
tion for jury determinat10n, and each trial and 
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appellate court must determine the question 
as a matter of law only when convinced that 
reasonabl~ persons could not disagree upon 
the quest10n when conscientiously applying 
fact to law." 
Under that test the facts of this case clearly 
call for a jury determination of whether defendant or 
plaintiff was guilty of an improper lookout. In 
Charvoz v. Cottrell, 12 Utah (2d) 25, 28, 361 Pac. 
(2d) 516 (1961) the fact situation was very similar 
to the present case. There the deceased was in the 
marked crosswalk, crossing the street at night. The 
lighting around the intersection was dim and the 
backdrop was dark. The road was black-top and 
the deceased was wearing dark clothing. The de-
fendant was driving at 30 miles per hour with his 
lights on. He applied his brakes as soon as he saw the 
deceased, but it was too late. The court held: 
" ... Therefore, although the evidence is 
undisputed that the defendant could have 
stopped his car in time to avoid the accident 
had he seen the deceased at a distance of 100 
feet, the circumstances are such as to create 
a doubt in the minds of reasonable men as to 
defendant's ability to observ~ the dec~dent 
at that distance and hence the issue of failure 
to keep a proper lookout was for the jury." 
In the present case the general condition of 
darkness and the fact that defendant was in the pro-
cess of turning so that his headlights were not direct-
ed into Rainbow Drive until the vehicle had substan-
tially completed its turn are easily sufficient to 
raise a question in the minds of reasonable men as 
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to whether defendant should, in the exercise of rea. 
sonable care, have seen the plaintiff sooner than 
he did. Thus the question was properly submitted to 
the jury. 
Point VI. 
The Court Properly Refused To Give Plain-
tiff's Requested Instruction Number 1 -
That The Defendant Be Found Negligent As 
A Matter Of Law. 
The law is extremely clear on this point. If 
fair minded men could draw different conclusions 
from the evidence, the issue of negligence is for the 
jury. In the present case the evidence of the plain-
tiff is not as believable as that of the defendant. 
The defendant and his wife testified that the impact 
was outside the crosswalk area and that they stopped 
within 2 to 3 feet. The front of the car was 15 feet 7 
inches east from the center of the unmarked cross· 
walk. Officer Katulas testified that had the de-
fendant been going only 5 miles per hour, as the 
defendant testified, he could have stopped in approx· 
imately 31/2 feet ( R. 299). Thus this evidence puts 
the place of impact well outside the unmarked cross· 
1 
walk area. Both parties concede that there was no 
1 
lighting in the immediate area and both claimed not ! 
to have seen the other until just before impact. Plain· 
tiff's testimony was that he was in the crosswalk 
area, but that he was looking south and not at the 
left turn lane. This evidence clearly offers a direct 
issue as to negligence. The situation is similar to that 
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in Charvoz v. Cottrell, supra. There the court said: 
"Certainly, if there is a conflict in the 
evidence, the question of negligence is not one 
?flaw, but one of fact to be determined by the 
Jury. However, even if the facts are undis-
p~ted, if fair-mi~ded men can honestly draw 
different conclus10ns from them the issue of 
negligence should be settled by a jury. In 
other words, negligence is a question for the 
jury unless all reasonable men must draw the 
same conclusion from the facts as they are 
shown." (Page 27) 
All reasonable men could hardly come to the 
same conclusion under the facts here. The instruction 
was, therefore, properly denied. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no basis for a new trial upon the 
grounds raised by the plaintiff. The facts of this 
case, even read in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff, clearly show evidence that this accident 
may well have been unavoidable on the part of either 
party. This court has made it clear that an instruc-
tion to that effect is proper where evidence suscepti-
ble of such interpretation is present. Likewise, the 
evidence presents closely drawn issues as to the neg-
ligence of both parties. The assertion that these 
issues could have been decided as a matter of law are 
patently without merit. 
The judgment of the trial court in the arrange-
ment and choice of instructions was well within 
its discretion. The plaintiff failed to present any 
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evidence or law to support his allegation that pre-
judice resulted from the striking of the confusing 
and speculative evidence of business loss and from 
the method of arranging the instructions. The busi-
ness of the courts would be unjustifiably interrupted 
if such actions by the court were deemed prejudicial. 
The issue of misconduct was not properly presented 
before the trial court. In the absence of competent 
evidence of misconduct there is no basis for a new 
trial, and even if there had been competent evidence 
there is no showing that the plaintiff was in any 
way prejudiced. 
vVe respectfully submit that the new trial was 
properly denied, there being no showing by the plain· 
tiff of any basis under Utah law or the facts of this 
case justifying a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted 
DON J. HANSON 
Hanson & Garrett 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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